As an introduction to the special issue on neurocognitive factors underlying age effects, we discuss a number of recent developments in the literature on aging. The classic distinction between generalized and process-specific cognitive changes with old age has reappeared in the distinctions between the frontal lobe hypothesis and more differentiated views of neurocognitive aging. We argue that neurological decay in the frontal cortex has important implications for cognitive control, but that the frontal lobe hypothesis does not capture the plethora of changes that characterize aging and incorrectly suggests a unitary effect. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
Cognitive effects of old age vary in frequency, direction, and extent. For example, slowing of information processing is ubiquitous among people over 60 years, but there is a fair chance of reaching the age of 90 years with no memory problems. Other cognitive abilities are not at all susceptible to age effects, such as color perception, or even improve, such as most linguistic functions. Despite this heterogeneous pattern of age effects, many researchers aim to identify a smaller number of underlying age effects. This tendency serves the parsimony principle, but carries the risk of overgeneralization, as was properly illustrated by the title of Cerella et al.'s (1993) book Adult Information Processing: Limits on Loss. When this book was published, the scene of gerontological psychology was still dominated by the distinction between generalized and process-specific effects of old age, as is also evident from special issues of the Journal of Gerontology (Schultz, 1994) and Acta Psychologica (Bashore & van der Molen, 1994) on this debate.
Since the first half of the 1990s, multiple transitions have taken place in the field. There has been a revolution in neurosciences, leading to converging knowledge on
